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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
In the Interest of
SUMMERS CHILDREN,
Persons under 18 years of age
ORIN JOHN WULFFENSTEIN,
Appellant,

BRIEF OF

RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action terminating the parental rights of Orin
John Wulffehstein to Tammy Summers (born 6-23-70) and Tina Marie
Summers (born 7-18-71), pursuant to the Utah termination of
parental rights statute, Utah Code Annotated, section 55-10-109
(1953) .
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a full evidentiary hearing the Second District
Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County ordered that Appellant's
parental rights be terminated.

The Juvenile Court later denied

Appellant's Motion to Produce Additional Testimony and Alternative Request for New Trial.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the orders of the Juvenile Court
affirmed, both as to the termination of Appellant's parental
rights and the denial of the Motion to Produce Additional
Testimony and Request for New Trial,
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent accepts Appellant's Statement of Facts with
the following exceptions:

First, Respondent would poin : out

that a hearing to terminate the parental rights of the mother
in the instant case was held prior to the hearing to terminate
the fatherfs parental rights. The fact that two separate hearings were held accounts for the time elapsing between the filing
of the petition and the actual hearing regarding termination of
Appellant's parental rights.
Secondly, Appellant states that he was unaware that the
juvenile court was holding hearings on the petition to terminate
his parental rights.

However, Appellant's attorney at the hear-

ing stated to the court:

"...I had received at one time a

phone call I did not know his whereabouts, I reviewed the case
with him and he found it impossible to appear." (Tr. 67, lines
3-5) .
Further, Appellant states that there are no other persons
desiring to adopt appellant's children.

There is nothing in the

record to support this statement; in fact, the children's caseworker testified that she had made recommendations regarding
adoption (Tr. 19) .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant also states that a hearing for review of the
Order terminating his parental rights was set for September 11,
19 75.

The Findings of Fact and Decree reflect that the matter

to be reviewed is simply the placement of the children for
adoption, as the Order directs (R. 88-89).
Finally, Appellant says he has an affidavit attached to
his Brief; however, no affidavit is attached anywhere to the
record or the Brief.
POINT I.
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT APPELLANT ABANDONED HIS
CHILDREN, THUS JUSTIFYING THE TERMINATION OF
HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, SECTION 55-10-109(1953).
The trial court concluded that Appellant abandoned his
children, based upon the following findings of fact:
(1).

Appellant's failure to provide financial
support for the children.

(2)

Appellant's lack of contact with the children.

(3)

A lack of intent to assume custody of the
children, and that

(4)

Appellant's whereabouts were unknown at
the time the findings of fact were entered.

Appellant contends that the above findings, even if true,
do not constitute abandonment.

He relies heavily upon the

standard for abandonment set forth in In Re Adoption of Walton,
123 U. 380, 259 P.2d 881 (1953), a case dealing with adoption
without parental consent by reason of abandonment.
In order to find abandonment the Walton court required
that the facts show that a parent had the specific intent to
sever all rights and duties of the parent-child relationship.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The court found that the facts present in Walton did not meet
that standard.

The father had made periodic support payments,

had visited the children and had cared for them in his home for
a one year period after his divorce from the mother.
In the instant case Appellant has never supported his two
children, has only visited with the children twice very briefly
during the summer of 19 73, has not written to the children or
their caseworker, and has not inquired as to the well-being of
his children.
Appellant could easily have kept in contact with the
children and their caseworker even though he was incarcerated
during much of the lives of the two children.

The facts of the

instant case do not fall within the Walton holding and thus are not
controlled thereby.
Furthermore, the Walton decision focused upon a different
statute from the one at issue here, Utah Code Annotated, Section
55-10-109 (.1953). The instant case speaks specifically to the
termination of parental rights and the above statute specifies
the elements required for abandonment in termination cases.

The

Walton case, and all other cases dealing with abandonment that
Appellant cites, deal with adoption and not with termination of
parental rights.
Utah Code Ann., Section 55-10-109 (1) (.6) states that:
(_1) The court may decree a termination
of all parental rights with respect to one or
both parents if the court finds:
(b) That the parent or parents have
abandoned the child. It shall be prima
facie evidence of abandonment that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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parent or parents, although having legal
custody of the child, have surrendered
physical custody of the child, and for a
period of six months following such surrender have not manifested to the child
or to the person having the physical
custody of the child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to make arrangements for the care of the child;
Under this statute it is prima facie evidence of abandonment if
a parent surrenders physical custody of his child, and for a
period of six months thereafter manifests no firm intention to
resume physical custody or to make arrangements for the care of
the children.
The following circumstances in the instant case come within the definition of abandonment set forth in the termination
statute:
(1) Appellant has not had physical custody of the
children since the birth of the second child, a
period of five years and thus substantially longer
that the six months required by the statute.
(2) Appellant has failed to make any arrangements
for the care of the children.
By failing to inquire about the children, by failing to
see or communicate with them Appellant has not even remotely
manifested an intention to resume physical custody of the children.
Although Appellant claims he was unaware of his right to
see the children, he wrote neither to them nor to the caseworker
in charge of their foster care.

In the case of State in the

Interest of Mario A., 514 P.2d 797 (Utah, 1973), this court stated

We do not think the caseworkers are
obligated to go to the extremes which
appellant claims they should have done in

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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order to kindle and increase a small
flame of desire to be reunited with
her children. We think if she was to
escape the provision of the statute
regarding evidence of abandonment,
the duty was upon her to manifest an
interest within the six-month period
after loss of custody. (514 P.2d 797
at P. 799).
In the Mario A. case the parent claimed that the caseworker
should have taken action to reunite her
at the least have provided her

with her children, or

with the means to visit them.

Applying the holding of Mario A. to the instant case, it is not
the duty of the caseworker to contact Appellant with reports of
the children when absolutely no interest has been shown.

Rather

it is the responsibility of Appellant to initiate visits or
inquiries about the children.

Appellant's incarceration was not

an insurmountable obstacle standing in the way of showing an
interest in his children.

The trial court rightly did not permit

Appellant to use his incarceration as an excuse.
Finally, it is important to stress again that the record
is devoid of any indication of intent on the part of Appellant
to assume actual custody of the children.

On the contrary,

Appellant related to the children's caseworker has intent to
relinquish his parental rights if he were returned to prison
(Tr. 18) .
In conclusion, the record in the instant case and the
established law support the finding of the trial court that
Appellant has abandoned his children as that term is defined in
Utah Code Ann., Section 55-10-109(1953), and thus his parental
rights were properly terminated by the trial court.

6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II.
THE JUVENILE COURT PROPERLY FOUND
FROM THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT APPELLANT
IS UNFIT OR INCOMPETENT BY REASON OF CONDUCT OR CONDITIONS SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL
TO HIS TWO CHILDREN, THUS SUPPORTING THE
TERMINATION OF HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION
55-10-109 (1953).
The trial court from the evidence presented found that
Appellant had a long history of aggressive criminal behavior,
that he had been incarcerated in the Utah State Prison and that
he had escaped from the Utah State Prison.

From these facts

the court found Appellant to be emotionally unstable and unable
to provide the security, stability and modeling necessary for
his two children.
Appellant challenges the above finding, arguing that the
appropriate history to examine is the time since the birth of
the children. Appellant states that one felony conviction and
one parole violation since the birth of the children are not
sufficient to support a finding of a history of criminal behavior.

Appellant further argues that he merely left Odyssey

House against medical advice, and thus it is error to find that
he escaped.
Assuming for the moment that the period of parenthood is
the pertinent time which should be examined in regard to the
conduct of Appellant, the record reflects that Appellant has
been in continual trouble with the law since the birth of the
older child, Tammy, on June 23, 1970.

7
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Rod Stowe, caseworker at the Utah State Industrial
School, served as Appellant's parole officer upon his initial
release from the Industrial School (Tr. 33-34) . He testified
that Appellant had been

reinstitutionalized at the Industrial

School, that he had run away and was arrested and placed in the
county jail on a juvenile court order on July 17, 1970 (Tr. 34).
Appellant remained in the county jail, although a juvenile, because his 18th birthday was in a matter of weeks (Tr. 34). Rod
Stowe further testified that he visited Appellant in the county
jail in July, August and September of 1970 (Tr. 36).
As Appellant's own Statement of Facts indicates, he was
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison from February, 1971, until
his release on May 15, 1973.

(Refer to Exhibit D, the commit-

ment order sending appellant to Utah State Prison for an indeterminate sentence on a charge of second degree burglary.)
Appellant was outside of prison only until July 26, 19 73, when
he was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County jail.

The facts in

this case indicate that Appellant has been incarcerated during
much of the time since the birth of his children and thus
Appellant's claim that he does not have a long history of
criminal behavior simply does not ring true.
Appellant moreover cannot lightly dismiss his exit from
Odyssey House, as he attempts to do.

As Dennis Holm, district

supervisor for adult probation and parole testified, a warrant
was immediately issued when Appellant's unauthorized absence
from Odyssey House became known (Tr. 7 ) . Law enforcement agencies
were notified of the outstanding warrant (Tr.8).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Clearly

Appellant's history since the birth of Tammy in June, 1970, ,
and his unauthorized exit from Odyssey House fully support the
finding of the trial court that Appellant has a history of
aggressive criminal behavior.
Appellant stresses the legal presumption that it will be
for the best interests of a child to be raised by the natural
parents.
Supreme

However, Appellant neglects to point out that the Utah
Court has said that:
Quite beyond and more important than
the rights and privileges of the parents
is the welfare of these children and their
prospects for becoming well-adjusted, selfsustaining individuals. This is the consideration of paramount importance. (State
v. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 P.2d 948 (1962).

Given the first responsibility of the court, that is, to
serve the welfare of the children before it, it stands to reason
that the court will examine any evidence which has bearing upon
this question.

If facts and circumstances existing before the

time of parenthood

offer

some insight to the court as to

whether certain conduct creates a serious detriment to the welfare of children, the court in its discretion may consider this
evidence.
In the instant case the juvenile court did receive all
legal documents relating to Appellant, including orders of commitment to the State Industrial School (Tr. 4 7).

Although some

of these documents related to events occurring before the birth
of the older child in June, 19 70, the court properly concluded
that events prior to that date had a direct bearing in determining whether Appellant's conduct was sufficiently detrimental

9
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to the children to support a termination of his parental rights.
Appellant is in error in arguing that the court may only examine
history since the birth of the minor children.

Since the wel-

fare of the children is of paramount importance anything relevant
to that issue should be admissible.
Appellant also argues that the record reflects no correlation between his aggressive criminal behavior, incarceration and
escape on the one hand, and the effect on his children on the
other hand.

He asserts that his absence from Odyssey House has

nothing to do with his children (Brief p. 10).
The very arguments Appellant makes belie any assertion
that he comprehends what it means to be a parent to Tammy and
Tina Summers.

The record amply reflects the effect of Appellant's

conduct on his children.
For example, Sally Patterson testified that she had been
a foster care worker for Tina Summers since November, 1972, and
for Tammy Summers, since approximately April, 1973 (Tr. 15).
Miss Patterson was the first foster care worker for each of the
children (Tr. 15). She testified that the children had been
in foster care almost three years at the time of the hearing,
that they needed a solid, permanent home where they can have a
mother and father to relate to as parents, not simply foster
parents (Tr. 19-20).
Miss Patterson further testified that the two girls were
becoming insecure about their foster home, wondering how long
they would be staying (Tr. 20). As Miss Patterson related to
court, the children were asking questions that could not be
answered about their family situation (Tr. 20).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Prior to the February 5, 1975 termination of parental
rights hearing Appellant had last visited with the two girls in
early July, 1973 (Tr. 16). At the time of the second visit
Appellant expressed to Miss Patterson that he did not know what
to do with the children during the visits (Tr. 44). It is
clear from the record Appellant did not know his children and
they did not know him.
Based upon her work with the two girls in the instant case
and her assessment of the family situation, Miss Patterson
testified that she would recommend Tina and Tammy for adoption
(Tr. 19).
Certainly the above testimony reflects the effect of
Appellant's conduct and absence on the two children.

The testi-

mony of Miss Patterson indicates that the uncertainty of the
children's situation is on ther minds. The children are questioning how long they are going to continue being foster children•
There is no relationship at all between Appellant and the two
girls.

The record thus supports a finding that Appellant's

conduct is seriously deterimental to Tina and Tammy and any hope
that these children have to grow up as well adjusted individuals
in a stable environment as State v. Dade, supra, proclaims to
be their right.
Appellant attempts to paint a picture of himself as a blameless individual caught up in a situation not of his own making
with no opportunity to come to know and support his children*
It must be remembered that Appellant's own voluntary acts led to
his incarceration.

His own voluntary act made him a fugitive

Digitized by.•the•Howard
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from Odyssey House.

His own voluntary act in violation of

parole resulted in his return to the Utah State Prison.
Appellant has had six years since the birth of Tammy, the
older child, to lead a law abiding life, secure a jobf arrange
a visitation schedule with his daughters, all with the goal of
one day assuming the care, custody and control of the children.
The record reflects absolutely no effort on his behalf to
achieve that goal.

Merely expressing an interest in his children

over the last six years is not exercising the responsibilities
that accompany parenthood.

The record presents cogent evidence

that Appellant desires all the rights of parenthood without
exercising even a scintilla of the responsibilities.
State v. Dade, supra, supports the proposition that the
welfare of the children is paramount.

Certainly evidence of

Appellant's history of criminal behaviorf his incarceration in
Utah State Prison, his escape from Odyssey House combined with
the fact that the two children need permanent planning and
Appellant has made no effort to provide it, all operate to
overwhelmingly rebut any presumption in Appellant's favor. The
welfare of Tammy and Tina require that the parental rights of
Appellant be terminated and the children be placed for adoption
in a permanent home at the earliest time.
POINT III.

•

DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S 'MOTION TO
PRODUCE ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS NOT AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION NOR A DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.
On February 5, 19 75, the first hearing was held on the

12
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petition to terminate Appellant's parental rights-

Qm May 9,

19 75, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Decree
ordering the termination.

At no time during any of the pro-

ceedings between these dates did Appellant choose to appear and
offer testimony.

Instead, Appellant voluntarily absented him-

self from all proceedings, having been served and given every
opportunity to appear and testify in his own behalf. While
due process of law demands that every person be allowed to
present his case and receive a full hearing upon all the evidence, it does not demand that the court repeatedly delay the
proceedings until the party finds it convenient to attend.

In

Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 30 Utah 2d 65
(1973) this court stated:
The rule that the courts will incline
towards granting relief to a party, who
has not had the opportunity to present his
case, is ordinarily applied at the trial
court level, and this court will not reverse
the determination of the trial court merely
because the motion could have been granted.
For this court to overturn the discretion of
the lower court in refusing to vacate a
valid judgment, the requirements of public
policy demand more than a mere statement that
a person did not have his day in court when
full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded
to him or his legal representative. The movant
must show that he has used due diligence and
.that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.
In the Airkem case, as in the present case, appellant knew
the approximate date of the hearing, and he also knew that it
was very difficult to contact him.

His failure to contact his

attorney under these circumstances was considered by the court
as a lack of due diligence.

Appellant in the present case was

not denied his "day in court," he simply chose to disregard it.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There were no circumstances beyond his control which prevented
him from attending.

He had been released from prison on parole

and would have been able freely to appear in court/ bmt he
violated the parole, absented himself from the area, snd failed
to notify his attorney of his whereabouts.

In such circum-

stances, there was no abuse of discretion nor denial of due
process in refusing to grant Appellant's motion for a mew trial
or to produce additional testimony.
Appellant was represented by counsel at the hearings. Considerable testimony was heard by the court, and the record shows
that evidence was presented which fully supports the courts
decision to terminate Appellant's parental rights.

Appellant's

brief stresses the reluctance of this court to sever family ties
and also the presumption that a child is better off with his
natural parent.

However, this court has recognized, as does

Appellant, that there are circumstances which make termination
"the only alternative to be found consistent with the best
interests of the children."
U.2d 407 (1970).
not favor

State v. Lance, 464 P. 2d 395, 23

Therefore, the fact that policy generally does

severing family relationships does not in itself in-

dicate an abuse of discretion in refusing to vacate a termination order in favor of hearing additional testimony.

According

to Appellant's brief, an affidavit showing the testimony which
would have been offered was presented to the trial court. Upon
review of such an affidavit, if the court determined that their
decision would not have been altered by such testimony, it was
not an abuse of discretion to deny appellant's motion. In the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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case of In Re State, 360 P.2d 486, 11 U.2d 393 (1963) , upon
which Appellant heavily relies, this court did hold that it
was error to deny the parent's motion to produce new testimony.
However, in that case, the parents were proceeding unfer the
claim that "changed conditions" made them more competent to
care for their children.

It was held to be an abuse of dis-

cretion not to investigate those changed conditions.
The facts of the present case differ significantly.

There

were no changed conditions which would have made Appellant more
capable of caring for his children.

If anything, conditions

had worsened in that Appellant faced an additional prison confinement for violation of parole. When it was obvious that
Appellant could offer no testimony which would change the results
of the hearings, it was not error to refuse to hear the additional testimony.
Appellant contends that because a review hearing was set
for September the termination order was not final until that
date, and additional testimony could have been heard at the
review hearing.

However, Appellant misunderstands the purpose

of such a review hearing.

It is statutorily required that the

Juvenile Court schedule a hearing for the purposes of reviewing the status of the children, the plans which have been made
in their behalf, and other "housekeeping" matters.

It is not

for the purpose of reconsidering the termination order; the
order of May 9, 19 75 was a final decree.
Appellant also advances the argument that parental rights
should not be terminated until prospective adoptive parents

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have been found and definite plans for adoption made*
policy seems to contradict such an argument*

Public

A child cannot be

placed for adoption until parental rights have been terminated.
To allow adoptive parents to become hopeful and make arrangements to receive the children, only to be disappointed if the
court does not order termination, violates the dictates of
good conscience. In the present case, the caseworker did indicate that the Division of Family Services planned to arrange
for the adoption of the Summers children, and possible adoptive
parents have been located.

But no adoption arrangements can or

should be made until these proceedings are completed. Therefore, Appellant's argument that it was error to terminate prior
to planning for adoption is not valid.
As Justice Callister noted in his dissent in In Re State,
it is important that the Juvenile Court be allowed some latitude
of discretion.

His policy discussion follows:

This court cannot exercise the discretion
which the juvenile court might, and in some
cases ought to have exercised. We cannot,
under the guise of reviewing an abuse of discretion by the juvenile court, substitute our
judgment for that of the juvenile court. Every
presumption should be indulged in favor of the
proper exercise by the juvenile court of its
discretion in granting or denying a hearing in
these cases.
This court should take a realistic view
of such situations and recognize that unless
the juvenile court is in fact allowed some
latitude of discretion, it will be practically
helpless in placing children found under such
unfortunate circumstances, and the Department
of Public Welfare will be required to bear the
whole burden of their upbringing while irresponsible parents continue to have more children
and to continue in their dissolute ways, and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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leave the responsibility of their care
to others. On the other hand if the
juvenile judge is clothed with some
discretion and authority, the children
can be placed, as has been done in this
case with four of the children, where
they may have a more wholesome well adjusted life with a promise to build lives
of that character for themselves and their
families; whereas, failure to allow the
court such prerogative tends to keep the
situation unsettled and to disturb it so
that permanent placements cannot be made*
360 P.2d at 492.
The Juvenile Court did not, in the present case, abuse
its discretion nor did it deny appellant his right to due
process of law.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has relied upon two main arguments to support

A

his request for reversal of the juvenile court order terminating
his parental rights. He has first argued that the findings of
the court were improperly entered and not supported by the
record.

As Respondent has clearly shown, case law establishes

the propriety in the circumstances of the instant case of both
the finding that Appellant abandoned his children and that he
is unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct seriously detrimental to the children.

Further, applying the facts and evidence

established in the record, Respondent has unequivocally supported
the above findings as entered by the juvenile court in ordering
the termination of Appellant's parental rights*
Appellant has also argued that the juvenile court abused
its discretion in denying his Motion to Produce Additional
Testimony or the Alternative Motion For a New Trial. As Respondent has shown, the juvenile court gave Appellant every opportunity
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to be heardf consistent with due process. Now, after an adverse
decision, Appellant seeks to blame the juvenile court for his
own failure to appear.

Appellant disregarded his opportunity to

personally contest the termination of parental rights petition.
The record and applicable law clearly support the decision of
the juvenile court to deny Appellant's post-hearing motions.

Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Assistant Attorney General

/ PAUL M. TINKER
Assistant Attorney General
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